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Abstract
A model of an oligopolistic market with a homogeneous product is examined.
Each subject of the model uses a conjecture about the market response to variations
of its production volume. The conjecture value depends upon both the current total
volume of production at the market and the subject's contribution into it. Under
general enough assumptions, the equilibrium existence and uniqueness theorems
are proven. Furthermore, a particular assumption { namely, constant elasticity, {
is considered, and the generalized Stackelberg model comprising several leaders is
investigated.
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In this paper, some well-known models of the oligopolistic market with a homogeneous
product have been extended to the case when the producers, instead of the standard
Cournot model assumptions, use the more general ones:
Gi(´) = G+ (´ ¡ qi)wi(G; qi): (1)
Here G is the current total volume of the product sold at the market, qi and ´ are the
current and expected supplies of the i{th producer, resp.,, whereas Gi(´) is the total
market volume conjectured by the i-th agent as a response to changing his (or her) own
supply from qi to ´. The conjecture function wi will be referred to as the i-th agent's
in°uence quotient. The standard Cournot model assumes wi ´ 1 for all i.
There exists a plethora of works on imperfect competition (cf. [1] { [9]) in which the
questions of the rationality of the assumptions are discussed. But the purpose of our paper
is somewhat di®erent. We aim at ¯nding some very general forms of possible conjectures
that allow an equilibrium to exist. The main di®erence of our framework from those of
the above cited papers consists in that we permit the conjectures being functions of two
variables (unlike in [3], [5] where they are functions of one variable). Moreover, we do not
demand that the in°uence quotients be di®erentiable or even continuous; the agents need
not to be identical (unlike [13]).
Another essential motivation for developing these results was a desire to formally embed
the Stackelberg model into the generalized Cournot framework, at least in terms of the ¯rst
order necessary conditions. This embedding is realized through the explicit construction of
the (one or multiple) leaders' in°uence quotients. Since a leading agent of the Stackelberg
model takes into account the other agents' optimal responses, the leader's conjecture
inevitably loses its smoothness if one of the followers stops producing. That leads not
only to rejecting the previously assumed continuity of factors wi in (1) , but also to the
splitting of conjecture (1) into two parts. More precisely, we allow the factors wi to take
di®erent values for ´ > qi and ´ < qi. These extentions lead to modifying some other
assumptions, too.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the extended problem speci¯ca-
tion, describes and partially discusses assumptions concerning functions relevant in the
model, and justi¯es the equilibrium notion. Section 3 is dedicated to the equilibrium
existence theorem, wereas Section 4 deals with theorems stating the uniqueness of the
equilibrium total volume. In Section 5, a particular case is examined, which comprises
a version of the model in which each agent supposes the elasticity of the total market
volume, with respect to his output, to remain constant. Section 6 deals with the par-
ticular case of in°uence quotients being functions of the total bargain volume only. In
Section 7, the Stackelberg model (more precisely, the one extended here) is embedded
formally into the generalized Cournot model. The embedding is realized in terms of the
¯rst-order optimality conditions. Section 8 provides some comparative statics analysis for
the generalized Cournot and Stackelberg models. Section 9 provides some examples of all
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the model types mentioned above, and compares them to each other. Section 10 contains
conclusions.
2 Problem Speci¯cation
Consider n ¯rms producing a homogeneous product and denote by qi the i-th ¯rm
current output and by fi(qi) its cost function, i = 1; : : : ; n. Let G be the total market
output volume, and p(G) be the inverse demand function value, i.e. the price of the
product unit established at the market with the total bargain volume G. We also allow
a constant volume Q of the extraneous supply of the product. Therefore, the balanced
market implies the equality G = Q+
P
qi.
As mentioned above, instead of (1), we use the conjectures
Gi(´) =
(
G+ (´ ¡ qi)w+i (G; qi); ´ > qi,
G+ (´ ¡ qi)w¡i (G; qi); ´ < qi:
(2)
From this onward, for brevity purposes, we omit the explicit indication of the fact that
Gi(´) is a function of G and qi, too. Behaviour of each subject is determined by its current
state (G; qi) and conjecture (2). Namely, if the i-th agent produces ´, then its expected
pro¯t is equal to
¹i(´) = ´p (Gi(´))¡ fi(´); (3)
and he chooses his optimal output volume maximizing function (3).
Since this paper deals only with static problems, we are interested in the situations
where each of the expected pro¯t functions (3) attains its (local) maximum at ´ = qi.
If the market is balanced, such a situation is naturally treated as an equilibrium. In
order not to avoid considering the interesting particular case of Section 5, we assume the
existence of conjectures (2) only for situations with G > 0, qi > 0. The expected pro¯t
function (3) is also de¯ned in this area. Nevertheless, under certain conditions, some
agents of the market can have zero outputs. Because of that, the equilibrium will be
de¯ned in terms of the ¯rst order necessary conditions for the expected pro¯t function
(3) to attain its maximum. The latter conditions are then extended to the agents with
qi = 0 in a natural manner.
Before the formal problem speci¯cation, we state the basic assumptions concerning the
cost functions fi, the conjecture derivatives w
§
i and the inverse demand function p.
A1. Each of the functions fi(qi) de¯ned over qi ¸ 0, are continuously di®erentiable,
non-decreasing and convex.
A2. The inverse demand function p(G) de¯ned for positive G is continuously di®eren-
tiable, p(G) > 0 and p0(G) < 0 for all G.




A4. For each i, the functions w§i (G; qi) are de¯ned for 0 < qi  G, and the products
qiw
§
i do not decrease over qi > 0. Furthermore, at the domain (G; qi) > 0, the function
w+i is upper semicontinuous (u.s.c) with respect to G and continuous from the right with
respect to qi; w
¡
i is lower semicontinuous (l.s.c.) by G and continuous from the left by qi,
and the following relationships take place:
0  w¡i (G; qi)  w+i (G; qi); (4)
and
w+i (G;G) = 1: (5)
A5. Principle of Potential Participation. For some k there exist G0 > 0 and
q0k > 0 such that the relationship G < G0 implies the inequality
p(G) + p0(G)G¡ f 0k(q0k) > 0: (6)
A6. The function p(G)G is concave with respect to G.
Assumption A4 needs some explanations. Equality G = qi means that the i-th agent
produces the whole output in a monopolistic manner, and condition (5) re°ects that.
In the classical Cournot model, w¡i (G; qi) = w
+
i (G; qi) = 1 for all (G; qi), which indi-
cates the absence of the other agents' reaction to the i-th subject's output variations. If
w§i (G; qi) > 1, then the i-th agent is expecting the others' total output to increase or
decrease simultaneously with its own product volume. Moreover, the rate of the expected
reaction grows together with the value w§i . Therefore, in this case, the right inequality in
(4) signi¯es that the rate of the reaction expected by the i-th agent to an increase in its
output is not lower than that to a decrease in it. In case of w§i (G; qi) < 1, the situation
is reverse. The others' common output variation is opposite to that of i-th subject, and
the rate of the former is growing when the function value w§i diminishes. However, non-
negativity of the latter values implies the shift of the total production volume to the same
direction as that of the i-th agent. At last, the right inequality in (4) indicates that the
market abandoned by the i-th subject is conquered with the rate equal or greater than
that of giving it up when seized by the same agent.
Monotonicity of the products qiw
§
i (G; qi) by qi can also be interpreted in economic
terms. Consider the following identities









The value ¢(G; qi; ´) indicates expected elasticity of the total product volume with respect
to the i-th subject's output. For ´ = qi § 0 one obtains ¢(G; qi; qi § 0) = qiw§i (G; qi)=G.
Therefore, the assumed monotonicity of qiw
§
i by qi for any ¯xed value G means that
the expected (by the i-th subject) elasticity of the total output does not decrease along
with the subject's contribution increasing. In addition, this monotonicity together with
condition (5) imply the inequality w+i (G; qi)  G=qi for 0 < qi < G.
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Now consider the functions ¾+i (G; qi) = qiw
+
i (G; qi)=G,
¾¡i (G; qi) = qiw
¡
i (G; qi)=G. Since they are monotone by qi and non-negative, we can
de¯ne their limit values as follows:
¾+i (G; 0) = limqi!0
¾+i (G; qi); ¾
¡
i (G; 0) = limqi!0
¾¡i (G; qi):
The functions ¾§i (G; qi) have a clear economic meaning. Namely, under conjecture (2),
¾+i (G; qi) presents the expected (by the i{th agent) elasticity of the total market output
with respect to its own output qi when the latter increases. The function ¾
¡
i (G; qi) can be
treated in a similar way when qi decreases. In the elasticity terms, assumption A4 allows
the following re-formulation.
A40. For each i, functions ¾§i (G; qi) are de¯ned for G > 0, 0  qi  G, and do not
decrease with respect to qi. Furthermore, for qi > 0, function ¾
+
i (G; qi) is u.s.c. by G
and continuous from the right with respect to qi, function ¾
¡
i (G; qi) is l.s.c. by G and
continuous from the left with respect to qi, and the following relationships are valid
0  ¾¡i (G; qi)  ¾+i (G; qi)  ¾+i (G;G) = 1: (7)
The assumed here monotonicity by qi signi¯es that at a ¯xed total market volume,
each subject expects his in°uence to grow (more precisely, not to decrease) along with
his contribution increase. The right equality in (7), similarly to (5), indicates that the
subject does not expect the other suppliers to arise when he's increasing his output after
having seized the market completely.
Principle A5 means that for G su±ciently small (and hence, p su±ciently high) there
exists at least one agent striving to increase his output volume over q0k.
Di®erentiating the expected pro¯t function (3) by ´, one obtains the relationships
¹0i(´) =
(
p (Gi(´)) + ´w
+
i (G; qi)p
0 (Gi(´))¡ f 0i(´); ´ > qi,
p (Gi(´)) + ´w
¡
i (G; qi)p
0 (Gi(´))¡ f 0i(´): ´ < qi.
(8)
At the point ´ = qi, the function ¹i(´) has the leftside derivative ¹
¡
i (G; qi) and the
rightside derivative ¹+i (G; qi) calculated by the formulae
¹+i (G; qi) = p(G) + ¾
+
i (G; qi)p
0(G)G¡ f 0i(qi); (9)
¹¡i (G; qi) = p(G) + ¾
¡
i (G; qi)p
0(G)G¡ f 0i(qi): (10)
Using the ¯rst order necessary local maximum conditions for each subject's expected
pro¯t function, we specify our problem as follows. Given Q ¸ 0, ¯nd a vector Z =
(G; q1; : : : ; qn) 2 Rn+1+ such that the balance equality holds
X
qi +Q = G; (11)
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and for each i, the following inequalities are valid:
¹+i (G; qi) = p(G) + ¾
+
i (G; qi)p
0(G)G¡ f 0i(qi)  0; (12)
and if qi > 0, then
¹¡i (G; qi) = p(G) + ¾
¡
i (G; qi)p
0(G)G¡ f 0i(qi) ¸ 0; (13)
If ¾+i (G; qi) = ¾
¡
i (G; qi) and qi > 0, inequalities (12) and (13) are tantamount to a single
equality.
In order to treat a solution to problem (12){(13) as an equilibrium for the agents with
qi > 0, we need showing concavity of each subject's expected pro¯t function.
Theorem 1. Under assumptions A1 { A6, for each agent with qi > 0, his expected
pro¯t function ¹i(´) is concave over ´ ¸ 0.
Proof. In order to prove the theorem, it su±ces to verify that both righthand sides
in (8) do not increase by ´ and that ¹+i (G; qi)  ¹¡i (G; qi). The latter inequality follows
from (7) and A2 immediately. As for the righthand sides in (8), we show the upper one
not to increase. The same property of the lower one can be demonstrated in a similar
manner.
Consider qi  ´1 < ´2. Since the value w+i (G; qi) is non-negative, it follows from (2)
that G  Gi(´1)  Gi(´2). Hence, making use of A2, we get p (Gi(´1)) ¸ p (Gi(´2)).
Moreover, A1 implies f 0i(´1)  f 0i(´2). In addition, if p0 (Gi(´1)) ¸ p0 (Gi(´2)), then
´1p
0 (Gi(´1)) ¸ ´2p0 (Gi(´2)) due to the negativity of p0. All the above inequalities taken
together imply ¹0i(´2)  ¹0i(´1).
Otherwise, if p0 (Gi(´1)) < p0 (Gi(´2)), we use (2) and re-arrange the di®erence ¹0i(´1)¡
¹0i(´2) in the form
¹0i(´1)¡ ¹0i(´2) = [p (Gi(´1))¡ p (Gi(´2))] + [Gi(´1)p0 (Gi(´1))¡
¡Gi(´2)p0 (Gi(´2))] +
n³
1¡ ¾+i (G; qi)
´
G [p0 (Gi(´2))¡ p0 (Gi(´1))]
o
+
+ [f 0i(´2)¡ f 0i(´1)] :
It is obvious from A6 that the sum of expressions in two former square brackets takes
non-negative values, and the last term is non-negative due to the convexity of fi. The
sign of the term in the curly brackets depends on that of the factor
³
1¡ ¾+i (G; qi)
´
which
is non-negative according to (7). The proof of the theorem is complete.
In what follows we justify the de¯nition of equilibrium from the point of view of an
agent with qi = 0. The maximum necessary and su±cient conditions (12){(13) for the
expected pro¯t function can be re-written in the form of the pair of inequalities
¡¾¡i (G; qi)p0(G)G  p(G)¡ f 0i(qi)  ¡¾+i (G; qi)p0(G)G: (14)
The concluding righthand term in (14) can be treated as a barrier that must be overhauled
by the di®erence between the price and the cost of production of an extra product unit
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(i.e. the marginal cost of production) for the i-th agent to motivate his output increase.
The beginning lefthand term is interpreted in a similar manner.
Since the concluding righthand term in (14) tends to the limit value ¡¾+i (G; 0)p0(G)G
as qi vanishes, it is natural enough to postulate the following behaviour of the agent with
qi = 0. Namely, he starts producing whenever the di®erence between the price p(g) and
f 0i(0) exceeds that limit barrier, i.e. the inequality p(G)¡f 0i(0) > ¡¾+i (G; 0)p0(G)G holds.
However, condition (12) means quite the opposite at qi = 0. Therefore, the agent i has
no reason to shift from zero when (12) takes place.
Notice that if conjecture (2) is valid for qi = 0 too, i.e. if the value w
+
i (G; 0) is well
de¯ned, then continuity of w+i from the right implies ¾
+
i (G; 0) = 0. Then it follows from
(12) that p(G)  f 0i(0), and again there is no reason for the i-th subject to start producing.
3 Existence Theorem
Assumptions A4 and A40 postulate only one-sided continuity of functions w§i and ¾
§
i
with respect to qi for ¯xed G and their semicontinuity with respect to G for ¯xed qi.
However, when proving the existence theorem, we need limit transitions with respect to
the variable pair (G; qi), including the case qi ! 0. To avoid the complicated discourses
in the main theorem, we obtain the lemmas stated below. First we extend the domain
of function w§i having accepted w
§
i (G; qi) = w
§
i (G;G) = 1 for qi > G > 0. Then
continuity and monotonicity assumptions from A4 are obviously not violated. The domain
of functions ¾§i (G; qi) and ¹
§
i (G; qi) is extended respectively without breaking assumption
A40.
Lemma 1. Functions ¹+i (G; qi) are continuous from the right with respect to qi and
lower semicontinuous by G for qi ¸ 0, as well as functions ¹¡i (G; qi) are continuous from
the left with respect to qi and upper semicontinuous by G for qi > 0.
Proof. The respective continuity of functions ¹§i by qi and semicontinuity by G at
qi > 0 follow immediately from A1, A2 and A4 (A4
0). As for the lower semicontinuity of
¹+i (G; qi) at qi = 0, it is equivalent to the upper semicontinuity of the function ¾
+
i (G; 0)
by G due to the same assumptions. However, the latter feature does take place because
of the obvious equality
¾+i (G; 0) = infqi>0
¾+i (G; qi)
and the function ¾+i (G; qi) upper semicontinuity by G for any qi > 0. This completes the
proof.
Lemma 2. Under assumptions A4 (A40) functions ¹+i ; ¹
¡




¹+i (G; qi) = ¹
+




¹¡i (G; qi) = ¹
¡
i ( ~G; ~qi); 8 ~G > 0; ~qi > 0:
Proof. Let us ¯x a positive ~G and a non-negative ~qi and consider an arbitrary sequence
of points (Gk; qki ) > 0 convergent to ( ~G; ~qi). For an arbitrary " > 0, there exists a number
K such that qki  ~qi + " for each k > K. The function ¹+i (G; qi) being monotonically
nonincreasing by qi (as it follows from A1 and A4
0), we obtain ¹+i (G
k; qki ) ¸ ¹+i (Gk; ~qi +
"); 8k > K: Since ¹+i (G; qi) is l.s.c. by G for positive qi, the latter inequality yields
lim inf ¹+i (G
k; qki ) ¸ lim inf ¹+i (Gk; ~qi + ") ¸ ¹+i ( ~G; ~qi + "): (15)
From the right-side continuity of ¹+i (G; qi) by qi, we have the relationship
lim"!+0 ¹
+
i ( ~G; ~qi + ") = ¹
+
i ( ~G; ~qi). Hence, inequalities (15) imply (as " ! +0)
lim inf ¹+i (G
k; qki ) ¸ ¹+i ( ~G; ~qi): (16)
Since the sequence (Gk; qki ) was selected arbitrarily, (16) implies
¹+i ( ~G; ~qi) = lim
qi!~qi+0
¹+i ( ~G; qi) ¸ lim inf
(G;qi)!( ~G;~qi)
¹+i (G; qi) ¸ ¹+i ( ~G; ~qi): (17)
The ¯rst assertion of the Lemma follows from inequalities (17). The second equality is
obtained in a similar way, thus completing the proof.
Theorem 2. Let Q > 0 and assumptions A1 { A4 hold. Then problem (11){(13) has
a solution. In addition, if assumption A5 is valid, then the problem is solvable in case
Q = 0, too.
Proof. For each i, we construct a multivalued mapping G 7! [q¡i ; q+i ] that associates
to each G > 0 a segment, the endpoints of which are de¯ned as follows:
q¡i = inf
n





qi : 0  qi  Hi : ¹¡i (G; qi) ¸ 0
o
; (19)
here Hi > 0 is the scalar from condition A3. Moreover, we put q
+
i = 0 and/or q
¡
i = Hi,
if one of the sets (18), (19) is empty.
Now we prove that q¡i  q+i . On the contrary, suppose that q¡i > q+i . Then ¹¡i (G; q¡i ) <
0 and q¡i > 0. In view of Lemma 1, the functions ¹
¡
i (G; qi) are continuous from the left




i ¡ ±) < 0. Since ¹¡i (G; qi) ¸ ¹+i (G; qi) for each pair (G; qi), it then
follows that ¹+i (G; q
¡
i ¡ ±) < 0, too. The latter inequality contradicts the de¯nition of q¡i .
Therefore, q¡i  q+i .
If both the sets subject to in¯mum and supremum in (18) and (19) are non-empty,
then Lemma 1 and monotonicity of functions ¹§i (G; qi) imply that all the points of the
closed segment [q¡i ; q
+
i ] satisfy inequalities (12) and (13). If the set in (19) is empty, then
¹+i (G; qi)  ¹¡i (G; qi) < 0 for all 0  qi  Hi, i.e. q¡i = q+i = 0, and qi = 0 satis¯es
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(12). On the other hand, if the set in (18) is empty, then ¹¡i (G; qi) ¸ ¹+i (G; qi) > 0 for
all 0  qi  Hi, i.e. q¡i = q+i = Hi. Thus we have shown that in each case except for
q¡i = q
+




i ] solve problem (12){(13).
Suppose that Q > 0. Consider the point-to-set mapping G 7! [q¡i ; q+i ] on the half-line
[Q;+1) and demonstrate it to be closed. Since the mapping's graph is the intersection
of the epigraph of the function q¡i (G) and the undergraph of the function q
+
i (G) (i.e. the
set of points f(G; ¸) : G > 0; ¸  q+i (G)g), it su±ces to establish the two sets' closedness.
In view of their symmetric construction, we do that only for the epigraph of the function




with Gk ¸ Q, qki ¸ q¡i (G) be convergent to a point
( ~G; ~qi). Two outcomes are possible. If there exisits an in¯nite subsequence with q
k
i = Hi,
then ~qi = Hi and the point ( ~G; ~qi) obviously belongs to the epigraph. Otherwise, if
qki < Hi from some k onward, then q
¡
i (G




k))  0. Since
¹+i (G; qi) is monotone with respect to qi, then ¹
+
i (G
k; qki )  0, too. In view of Lemma 2,
we obtain the limit relationship ¹+i ( ~G; ~qi)  0, which means that ( ~G; ~qi) belongs to the
epigraph of the function q¡i (G). The closedness of the undergraph of the function q
+
i (G)
is established in a similar manner. Thus the closedness of the mapping G 7! [q¡i ; q+i ] is
veri¯ed.
Now consider the sum of above constructed mappings and the value Q, i.e. the multi-





We examine this mapping on the segment [Q;Q +
P
Hi]. It is easily checked that all
the conditions of the Kakutani theorem are satis¯ed in this case, so there exists a ¯xed
point G 2 A(G). In other words, there is a (n + 1)-tuple Z = (G; q1; : : : ; qn) satisfy-
ing the balance equality (11) and the restrictions q¡i (G)  qi  q+i (G), i = 1; : : : ; n.
Now we demonstrate that q¡i (G) < Hi holds. Indeed, if q
¡
i (G) = Hi for some i, then
qi = Hi, hence (11) and Q > 0 imply G > Hi . However, the latter along with A3 yields
p(G) ¡ f 0i(Hi) < 0 which means that ¹¡i (G;Hi) < 0. Since ¹¡i (G; qi) is continuous by
qi from the left, we come to q
+
i (G) < Hi = q
¡
i (G) which contradicts the above obtained
estimate q¡i  q+i . Thus, the inequality q¡i (G) < Hi really holds, whence qi solves problem
(12){(13) and the whole (n+1){tuple Z = (G; q1; : : : ; qn) solves problem (11){(13). This
completes the proof in case Q > 0.
Now let assumption A5 be valid. For each Q > 0, ¯x up some (n + 1){tuple
Z(Q) = [G(Q); q1(Q); : : : ; qn(Q)] solving problem (11){(13), and direct Q to zero. Since
the estimates Q  G(Q)  Q + PHi, 0  qi < Hi hold, there exists a cluster point
~Z = ( ~G; ~q1; : : : ; ~qn). Suppose that ~G = 0. Then a positive Q exists such that G(Q) < G
0
and qk(Q) < q0k which is prohibited by A5. Hence ~G > 0, and we can use Lemma 2
implying that the (n+ 1){tuple ~Z solves problem (11){(13) in case Q = 0. The theorem
is proven completely.
Remark 1. In the particular case when w¡i = w
+
i ´ 1, assumptions A1 | A3 guar-
antee the equilibrium existence.
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4 Uniqueness of Solution
The question of the equilibrium uniqueness can be divided into two parts. First,
from the general modeling point of view, it is interesting to examine uniqueness of the
equilibrium total market bargain volume G. This aspect is thouroughly investigated in the
section. However in the general case, at the equlilibrium state, that total bargain volume
can be distributed among the active producers in various proportions. This question is
connected with the uniqueness of solutions to the local problems (12){(13) and discussed
brie°y in the end of the section.
To examine conditions ensuring uniqueness of the solution to problem (11){(13), we
keep assumptions A1 { A6 intact and add the following one.
A7. For each i, relationships 0 < G1 < G2 and 0 < ± < 1 imply the inequality
w+i (G1; ±G1)  w¡i (G2; ±G2): (20)
Moreover,
w¡i (G; qi) <
G
qi
; if 0 < qi < G: (21)
Notice that condition (20) re°ects the co-ordinated non-decreasing of functions w+i and
w¡i along the rays emitting from the origin and contained in the positive orthant. The
condition can be re-written also as ¾+i (G1; ±G1)  ¾¡i (G2; ±G2) which implies the limit
relationship ¾+i (G1; 0)  ¾¡i (G2; 0) when ± vanishes. Thus, under assumption A7, the
inequality
¾+i (G1; ±G1)  ¾¡i (G2; ±G2) (22)
is valid for ± ¸ 0.
De¯nition 1. Let Z(Q) = [G(Q); q1(Q); : : : ; qn(Q)] be an equilibrium. We call it
non-monopolistic, if qi < G, i = 1; : : : ; n.
Theorem 3. Under assumptions A1 { A7, for each Q ¸ 0, the non-monopolistic
equilibrium total bargain value G(Q) is determined uniquely.
Proof. For a given Q ¸ 0, on the contrary, suppose that there exist two non-
monopolistic equilibria
Z1(Q) = [G1(Q); q
1
1(Q); : : : ; q
1
n(Q)];
Z2(Q) = [G2(Q); q
2
1(Q); : : : ; q
2
n(Q)]
with G1 = G1(Q) < G2(Q) = G2. De¯ne
I(G1) = f1  i  n : q1i (Q) > 0g;
I(G2) = f1  i  n : q2i (Q) > 0g:
9
Observe that G2 > Q and consequently, I(G2) 6= ;. Now we prove that for each i 2 I(G2)







Indeed, denote by q1 = q
1
i (Q) and q2 = q
2
i (Q) and suppose, on the contrary, that q2=G2 ¸
q1=G1. Then obviously q2 > q1 and there exists ~q such that q1  ~q  q2 and ~q=G2 =
q1=G1 = ±. Using (22) and A4
0, we obtain
0  z1 = ¾+i (G1; q1)  ¾¡i (G2; ~q)  ¾¡i (G2; q2) = z2:
Since Z2(Q) is a non-monopolistic equilibrium, then q2 < G2, and condition (21) implies
z2 < 1. Moreover, relationships (12),(13) for this i yield
p(G1) +G1p
0(G1)z1 ¡ f 0i(q1)  p(G2) +G2p0(G2)z2 ¡ f 0i(q2):
Convexity of fi allows one to omit the last terms in both parts without ceasing the
inequality to be valid:
p(G1) +G1p
0(G1)z1  p(G2) +G2p0(G2)z2: (24)
If z1 = 0, then (24) contradicts decreasing of p(G). Let z1 > 0. Subtract from (24) the
inequality (1¡z2)p(G1) > (1¡z2)p(G2), which takes place because of A2 and z2 < 1, and
obtain the relationship z2p(G1)+G1p
0(G1)z1 < z2p(G2)+G2p0(G2)z2. Taking into account
that z2 ¸ z1 > 0 and p0(G1) < 0, we deduce from the latter the following inequality
p(G1) +G1p
0(G1) < p(G2) +G2p
0(G2):
Since G1 < G2, the last inequality contradicts A6. Thus, we have proven that (23) holds
for i 2 I(G2).
Inequality (23) shows that I(G2) µ I(G1). Consequently, the balance equalities for Z1



























which leads to an impossible inequality 1 < 1. It means that the assumption about
existence of two non-monopolistic equilibria with di®erent total bargain volumes was
wrong, which completes the proof of the Theorem.
IfQ > 0, then each equilibrium is non-monopolistic. In this case, according to Theorem
3, the value of equilibrium total bargain volume G(Q) is unique. However if Q = 0,
both monopolistic and non-monopolistic equilibria with di®erent total bargain values
10
may occur in the framework of a single problem. For instance, that situation is possible
when functions fi and ´(G) = p(G)G are piece-wise linear. Nevertheless, the following
result obtains:
Corollary 1. In addition to Theorem 3 assumptions, suppose that for each i either fi
is strictly convex, or for all G > 0 the relationships 0  q1i < q2i imply the inequality
¾+i (G; q
1





Then the non-monopolostic equilibrium vector Z(Q) is unique.
Proof. On the contrary, suppose that for an equilibrium total bargain volume G and
for some i 2 I(G), there exist certain values 0 < q1i < q2i satisfying inequalities (12) and
(13). Then use either strict convexity of fi or inequality (25) and write down the series
of relationships
0  ¹¡i (G; q2i ) = p(G) + ¾¡i (G; q2i )p0(G)G¡ f 0i(q2i ) <
< p(G) + ¾+i (G; q
1
i )p
0(G)G¡ f 0i(q1i ) = ¹+i (G; q1i )  0;
which implies an impossible inequality 0 < 0. This contradiction completes the proof.
Remark 2. Under assumptions of Corollary and with Q > 0, the (non-monopolistic)
equilibrium exisits uniquely. In order to get a similar result in case of Q = 0, we need
specifying the form of the in°uence coe±cients w§i , as it is done in Sections 5 and 6.
Remark 3. Monopolistic equilibria (when Q = 0) can be found out by maximiz-
ing functions ¹k(G;G) = p(G)G ¡ fk(G) along the half-axis (0;+1) under conditions
¹+i (G; 0)  0 for i 6= k.
Remark 4. In the particular case when w+i = w
¡
i ´ 1, assumptions A1{A3 and func-
tions f 0i being monotone increasing su±ce to prove the existence of a unique equilibrium.
5 Case of Constant Elasticity
In this Section, we discuss in more details the particular case when the functions fi
and p are twice continuously di®erentiable, and functions w+i and w
¡
i coincide over all the
positive orthant (G; qi) > 0 except for the diagonal ray qi = G; qi > 0, and they assume
the following form:
w¡i (G; qi) = w
+
i (G; qi) = ®i + ¾i
G
qi
; if 0 < qi < G; (26)
w¡i (G;G) = ®i + ¾i; w
+
i (G;G) = 1: (27)
11
Here 0  ¾i < 1; 0  ®i  1 ¡ ¾i. It is easily veri¯ed that these w¡i and w+i satisfy
conditions A4 and A7. Therefore, Theorems 1 and 2 are valid for problem (11){(13) with
these functions. As p is twice di®erentiable, condition A6 reduces to the inequality
2p0(G) + p00(G)G  0; 8G > 0: (28)
Moreover, we replace condition (25) from Corollary 1 by the following (a bit stronger)
assumption.
A8. Functions fi and p are twice continuously di®erentiable, and for each i either
f 00i (qi) > 0 for all qi > 0 and limqi!+1
f 0i(qi) = +1, or ®i > 0.
The case ®i = 0 corresponds to a constant elasticity of the expected total bargain
volume G variation with respect to that of qi. Lemma 3 proven below is an instrument
for investigating the generalized Stackelberg model. Since the case Q > 0 is the only
relevant at that, the value w+i (G;G) = 1 will not be actually used.
Under assumption A8 along with fi and p being twice di®erentiable, examine the
behaviour of solutions qi = qi(G) to problem (12){(13) which reduces to the following
form: ¯nd a qi ¸ 0 satisfying conditions
qi = 0; if f
0
i(0)¡ ¾ip0(G)G¡ p(G) ¸ 0; (29)
and
f 0i(qi)¡ ®iqip0(G)¡ ¾ip0(G)G¡ p(G) = 0; (30)
if qi > 0. Extend functions fi smoothly to the negative half-axis (¡1; 0), having put






i =2 at the points qi < 0. Under assumptions A1{A8,
solutions ~qi = ~qi(G) of equation (30) are determined uniquely and continuously di®er-
entiable for all G > 0. If ~qi(G) > 0 at G > 0, then the function qi(G) coincides with
~qi(G). Otherwise, if ~qi( ~Gi) = 0 at some ~Gi, i.e. f
0
i(0) = ¾ip
0( ~Gi) ~Gi + p( ~Gi), then due to
0  ¾i < 1 and assumptions A2, A6, we have the inequality f 0i(0) > ¾ip0(G)G + p(G)
hold at each G > ~Gi. Therefore, ~qi(G) < 0 for such G whereas qi(G) = 0. Thus, we have
proven that qi(G) = maxf~qi(G); 0g, and functions qi(G) are continuously di®erentiable
everywhere except for the single point ~Gi. At the point ~Gi, the function qi(G) has one-
sided derivatives q0i( ~Gi + 0) = 0 and q
0
i( ~Gi ¡ 0)  0. Derivatives of the functions qi(G) at
the points G < ~Gi can take either positive or negative values. However, we demonstrate
below that at the points G satisfying the inequality
Q+
X
qi(G)  G; (31)
(for instance, at an equilibrium), there is at most one subject with the positive derivative
value. De¯ne
I(G) = fi : qi(G) > 0g; I+(G) = fi 2 I(G) : q0i(G) > 0g:
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Lemma 3. Let assumptions A1{A8 be valid and conjectures w§i be de¯ned by (26){







1¡ 2QG ; if I
+(G) 6= ;,
0; if I+(G) = ;.
(32)
Proof. Since equality (30) takes place for i 2 I(G), we can use the Theorem of Implicit
Function Di®erentiability and express the derivative
q0i(G) =
p0(1 + ¾i) + ¾ip00G+ ®iqip00
f 00i (qi)¡ ®ip0
; i 2 I(G): (33)
Here the argument G is omitted in the righthand side. From A2 and A8, it follows that
fracture (33) denominator always takes positive values. Therefore, the sign of derivative
q0i(G) coincides with that of fraction (33) numerator.




[(1¡ ¾i)p0 + ¾i(2p0 + p00G)] < 0:
However, if ®i > 0, the situation is more complex, since q
0
i(G) can take either positive or
negative values . Suppose that q0i(G) > 0. In this case, the numerator in (33) is obviously
positive. Since f 00i ¸ 0, then deleting it we obtain from (33)










Thus we have shown that under inequality (31) holding (e.g. at an equilibrium point)
there can be at most one subject with positive derivative q0i(G).
Now we can evaluate
P
i2I(G)
q0i(G) in case when
P





i(G)  0. Otherwise, if I+(G) = fi0g, then qi0  G¡Q, and (34) implies
X
i2I(G)






Since q0i( ~Gi + 0) = 0 and q
0
i( ~Gi ¡ 0)  0 for i =2 I(G), i.e. when G ¸ ~Gi, the Lemma's
assertion follows from inequality (35).
Theorem 4. Let assumptions A1{A8 be valid and conjectures w§i be de¯ned by (26){
(27). In addition, if Q = 0, let f 00i (qi) > 0 for all i and qi ¸ 0. Then the equilibrium vector
Z(Q) exists uniquely.





i(G) < 1. Otherwise, i.e. if Q = 0, then the positivity of f
00
i
allows one to re-write (34) with the strict inequality:















i(G) < 1. Therefore, in both cases, one can
conclude that if balance equality (11) takes place for some quantity G > 0, then the
di®erence G¡Q¡P qi(G) strictly increases with growing of G after that. So, the balance
equality cannot hold for any G greater than the above quantity, which means that problem
(11) { (13) has a unique solution. This completes the proof.
6 In°uence Quotient as Function of Total Bargain
Volume Only
In this section, we consider another particular case of the generalized Cournot model in
which the agents' in°uence quotients are continuous functions of the total bargain volume
only: wi = wi(G), i = 1; : : : ; n. In that case, the equilibrium problem reduces to the form:
given Q ¸ 0, ¯nd a n-tuple [q1(Q); : : : ; qn(Q)] such that, for each agent i = 1; : : : ; n, under




i(qi)¡ qiwi(G)p0(G)¡ p(G) ¸ 0; (36)
'i(qi) = 0; if qi > 0; (37)




Complementarity problem (36){(38) shows that the agent i need not vary its output qi
provided that he uses conjecture wi(G).
Begin with conditions that guarantee existence of solution to problem (36){(38). As-
sume functions fi; wi and p to satisfy the following requirements.
AA1. Each of functions fi(qi), i = 1; : : : ; n; de¯ned at qi ¸ 0 are convex, twice
continuously di®erentiable and non-decreasing.
AA2. Inverse demand function p(G) de¯ned for positive values of G is twice continu-
ously di®erentiable, takes positive values, and p0(G) < 0 for each G > 0.
AA3. For each i = 1; : : : ; n there exists a scalar Hi > 0 such that
f 0i(Hi) = p(Hi): (39)
AA4. Each of the functions wi(G) de¯ned at G > 0 are continuous and take non-
negative values.





0(G)G¡ p(G) < 0:
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Remark that assumption AA5 is surely valid if the right-side derivative p0(+0) is ¯nite
and assumptions AA1 { AA4 take place. Also notice condition (39) to be natural enough.
Indeed, if the latter fails for some agent i, then one of the following relationships holds:
either
a) f 0i(0) ¸ lim
G!+0
p(G); in this case, the agent i produces nothing and can be excluded
from the model;
or
b) f 0i(G) < p(G) for every G > 0; moreover, if lim
G!+1
[p(G)¡f 0i(G)] > 0, then production
of an arbitrary large amount of the good is pro¯table for the i-th agent which means that
problem (36){(38) is unsolvable. Only in case when
lim
G!+1
[p(G)¡ f 0i(G)] = 0 and lim sup
G!+1
[¡p0(G)=p00(G)] < +1
the problem has a solution, but we do not consider that extremal case.
Since the problem considered here is a particular case of the generalized Cournot model
examined in Sections 1 { 4, proofs of the theorems below are omitted.
Theorem 5 Let Q > 0 and assumptions AA1 { AA4 hold. Then problem (36){(38)
is solvable. In addition, if assumption AA5 is also valid, then the problem has a solution
for Q = 0, too.
In order to establish the solution uniqueness, we keep assumptions AA1 { AA5 and
add the following ones.
AA6. For each i = 1; : : : ; n, function wi is di®erentiable and non-decreasing. Moreover,
it takes only positive values not exceeding the unity.
AA7. The function p(G)G is concave.
Theorem 6. If assumptions AA1 { AA7 are valid and f 00i (G) > 0 for every i and
G ¸ 0, then problem (36) { (38) is solvable uniquely.
Remark 5. In the particular case when wi ´ 0 for every i (the perfect competition),
conditions AA1 { AA3 are su±cient for the existence of solution to problem (36) { (38).
To guarantee the solution's uniqueness, we demand the derivative f 0i to increase strictly
for each i.
7 Market with Leaders
In this Section, we generalize the Stackelberg model [14] and embed it into the above
frameworks. In the classical Stackelberg model, one of the ¯rms takes into account the
response of the other market agents to its output variations, and maximizes its pro¯t. In
paper [11], such a ¯rm is called a leader. Now we examine the case of several leaders,
who act toward each other as the classical Cournot agents, whereas the followers behave
according to the model of Section 4. As it was mentioned in the Introduction, we are going
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to embed the generalized Stackelberg model into the general framework making use of the
¯rst order optimality conditions. It means that we are looking for such a situation where
the leaders' pro¯t functions have stationary points. Unfortunately, the space limitations
have not permitted to ¯nd out whether the stationary points satisfy the second order
su±cient optimality conditions. So, from here onward, we will talk not about equilibria
of the generalized Stackelberg model but of its stationary points.
Theorem 7. Let assumptions A1{A3, A5, A6, A8 hold, and functions w§j (G; qj),
j = s+1; : : : ; n be de¯ned by equalities (26), (27). Then the generalized Stackelberg model
has a stationary point.
Proof. Let the former s ¯rms (1  s < n) be treated as leaders, i.e. they take
into acccount the rest (n ¡ s) agents' reaction to variations of the leaders' total output
Q =
Ps
i=1 qi. Towards each other they act as the classical Cournot subjects, i.e. they
suppose the other leaders not to change their outputs. At last, the latter (n¡s) ¯rms use
the above tactics with the extraneous supply Q and functions w¡j , w
+
j de¯ned in (26){
(27). The classical Stackelberg model needs s = 1, ®i = 1, ¾i = 0, i = 2; : : : ; n. In view of
A1{A8, for each Q ¸ 0, solution Z(Q) = [G(Q); qs+1(Q); : : : ; qn(Q)] to problem (11){(13)
exists uniquely and is di®erentiable everywhere except for the points ~Gi at which only





by Q and using estimate (32), we show that G(Q) is strictly increasing, G(0) > 0, and
G(Q) ¸ Q for all Q ¸ 0.
In order to embed our problem into the general model examined above, we need de¯ning
functions w+i and w
¡
i for i = 1; : : : ; s. According to supposed leader's behaviour, the i¡th
leader's conjecture indicates that its output variation (´¡ qi) leads to the extraneous (for
the second group of subjects) supply changing by the value (´ ¡ qi), too. Hence, the
i¡th leader assumes that the balance equality (36) remains valid after replacing Q by
(Q+ ´¡ qi). Di®erentiating this equality by ´ from the left and right at the point ´ = qi
and ¯nding out the one-side derivatives dGi=d´(qi § 0), we construct the functions w+i
and w¡i for i = 1; : : : ; s. Namely, if G > G(0), then the value Q(G) > 0 (i.e. such that
G(Q(G)) = G) is determined uniquely, and for 0 < qi  Q(G) we obtain















In view of Lemma 3,







Furthermore, these functions coincide and are continuous everywhere except for the points
~Gi. As for the break points, function u
¡(G) is continuous from the left and u+(G) is
continuous from the right at them. This is in line with assumption A4. In order to apply
Theorem 1, we need de¯ning formally functions w§i , i = 1; : : : ; s at all points G > 0,
0 < qi  G without violating condition A4.
Let us begin with the points (G; qi) for G > G(0) and Q(G) < qi  G. To preserve the
monotonicity of products qiw
§
i (G; qi) and ensure condition (5) to hold at the considered
points (G; qi), we put





having determined the quotients from the equations
®§(G) + ¾§(G)=Q(G) = u§(G); ®§(G) + ¾§(G)=G = 1: (45)
Since Q(G) < qi  G, the values (44) lie between u§(G) > 0 and 1, i.e. they are positive.
Solving system (45) and substituting the values ®§ and ¾§ into (44), we ¯nd
w§i (G; qi) =
G [1¡Q(G)=qi] + [G=qi ¡ 1]Q(G)u§(G)
G¡Q(G) : (46)
Since the quotient before u§(G) is non-negative for qi  G, thus de¯ned functions w§i
keep the respective semi-continuity properties. Besides, in view of (39), the following
upper limit value is ¯nite and non-negative:







Taking the upper limit in (46) when G! G(0), we put









Non-negativity of (46) and (48) allows one to de¯ne w+i (G; qi) = 0 for G < G(0) and
w¡i (G; qi) = 0 for G  G(0).
It is readily veri¯ed that thus de¯ned functions w¡i and w
+
i satisfy all the conditions
of Theorem 1, and therefore, a stationary point does exists. The proof is complete.
Remark 6. Under a slightly stricter assumptions, it can be shown that V + = 0, hence
w+i (G (0) ; qi) = 1. For instance, to obtain that, it su±ces to assume that either f
00
i
are strictly positive, or p(G)G is strictly concave, or at least two followers have positive
outputs qi at the equilibrium with Q = 0 (that is, in the absence of leaders).
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8 Comparison of Equilibrium Totals in Cournot and
Stackelberg Models
In this Section, we consider the classical Stackelberg model, i.e. we put s = 1. In that
case we have q1 = Q, and the leader maximizes his expected pro¯t:
maxf¹1(Q) = p (G(Q))Q¡ f1(Q) j Q ¸ 0g; (50)







qj(Q) is the equilibrium total volume of outputs produced by the agents j =
2; : : : ; n, who solve problem (11){(13) with the external supply Q and their in°uence
quotients w§j de¯ned by (26){(27).
In what follows we establish relationships between the solution Q¤ of problem (50) and
the equilibrium output volume Q̂ of the ¯rst agent if he does not behave as a leader but
uses, like others, the in°uence quotients w§1 de¯ned by (26){(27). Besides, it is interest-
ing to compare the values Q¤ and Q̂ to the leader's optimal output volume ¹Q when he
ignores the variation of the price. In other words, he solves the following complementarity
problem: ¯nd ¹Q ¸ 0 such that






¸ 0; ¹Q ¢ ¯1( ¹Q) = 0: (51)
Theorem 8. Let assumptions A1{A8 hold. Then
max fQ̂;Q¤ g  ¹Q  H1; (52)
here H1 > 0 is the scalar from assumption A3, i.e. such that f
0
1(H1) = p(H1).
Proof. In order to prove the inequality Q¤  ¹Q, it su±ces to demonstrate ¹01(Q+0) < 0
8Q > ¹Q. Assumptions A1, A2 and the inequality G0(Q+0) > 0 established above, imply
the estimate
¹01(Q+ 0) = p
0 (G(Q))G0(Q+ 0)Q¡ ¯1(Q) < ¡¯1(Q) 8Q > 0:
De¯nition of ¹Q implies ¯1( ¹Q) ¸ 0. Therefore, it su±ces to verify ¯ 01(Q+ 0) > 0 for every
Q > 0. But we have ¯ 01(Q+0) = f
00
1 (Q)¡p0 (G(Q))G0(Q+0), and the required inequality
follows from assumptions A1{A2 and the property G0 > 0. Thus the estimate Q¤  ¹Q is
established.
Now verify the inequality Q̂  ¹Q. On the contrary, suppose that Q̂ > ¹Q. Since the
function G(Q) strictly increases, we have G(Q̂) > G( ¹Q). According to the de¯nition of















¡ f 01(Q̂) = 0:
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Making use of conditions A1, A2, A8 and de¯nition (51) of the value ¹Q, put the series of
inequalities




¡ f 01( ¹Q) = ¡¯1( ¹Q)  0;
that leads to the contradiction. Therefore, indeed Q̂  ¹Q, and the ¯rst inequality in series
(52) is thus veri¯ed.





p( ¹Q) due to (51) and the function p being strictly decreasing. Now it follows from A1{A3
that f 01(Q) > p(Q) if Q > H1. Therefore, ¹Q  H1, and the theorem is proven completely.
Notice that the operation of taking the maximal of two values Q̂ and Q¤ in estimate
(52) is essential. The point is that in contrast to paper [11], where the estimate Q̂  Q¤
has been established, the weaker conditions on the inverse demand curve p(G) introduced
in this paper do not allow one to deduce the similar estimate in the general case. Moreover,
there exist such examples when the leadership of a weak (in a certain sense) agent leads to
decreasing of his own (and therefore, the total) output level, i.e. Q¤ < Q̂ (and therefore,
G(Q¤) < G(Q̂)). Now we will consider a particular case of our problem when more speci¯c
assumptions about the functions p and fi permit us to prove the strict concavity of the
leader's pro¯t function ¹1(Q). After that, we will be able to establish the relationship
between Q̂ and Q¤ using only a local information.
Namely, suppose the function p to be three times di®erentiable and satisfy the condition











for each G > 0. Moreover, let each cost function be linear, i.e. fi(qi) = ciqi; i = 1; : : : ; n,
and the in°uence quotients have the form (26){(27) with ®i > 0, i = 1; : : : ; n. Now it is
easily veri¯ed that
qi(G) =
ci ¡ p(G)¡ ¾iGp0(G)
®ip0(G)







; i 2 I:






































































































Therefore, the second derivative ¹001(Q) takes up negative values if G
0  1
Q(¡p00=p0) . But
the last inequality is valid by (53) for each Q > 0 such that the derivative G0(Q) exists.
At last, if only one-sided derivatives of the function G ( and hence, of the function ¹1)
exist at the point Q, we will show that ¹01(Q ¡ 0) > ¹01(Q + 0). Indeed, if i 2 I(G ¡ 0)
and i =2 I(G+0), then it is readily veri¯ed that q0i(G¡0) < 0 and q0i(G+0) = 0. Thus we
deduce from (32) and the continuity of G(Q) that G0(Q¡ 0) < G0(Q+ 0). Now making
use of the formulae
¹01(Q¡ 0) = p(G(Q)) + p0(G(Q))G0(Q¡ 0)Q¡ f 01(Q);
¹01(Q+ 0) = p(G(Q)) + p
0(G(Q))G0(Q+ 0)Q¡ f 01(Q)
and the function p being strictly decreasing, we obtain
¹01(Q¡ 0) > ¹01(Q+ 0)
20
for each Q > 0 where ¹1 is not di®erentiable.
Thus, the function ¹1 is strictly concave. Hence, we obtain the complete classi¯cation
of comparison cases based upon the following local rules:
(i) if G0(Q̂+ 0) ¸ 1 and G0(Q̂¡ 0)  1; then Q¤ = Q̂; G(Q¤) = G(Q̂);
(ii) if G0(Q̂+ 0) < 1; then Q¤ > Q̂; G(Q¤) > G(Q̂);
(iii) if G0(Q̂¡ 0) > 1; then Q¤ < Q̂; G(Q¤) < G(Q̂):
For example, if n = 1 and q02(Ĝ) < 0; then Q
¤ > Q̂, consequently G(Q¤) > G(Q̂). On the
other hand, if q01(Ĝ) < 0, and q
0
2(Ĝ) > 0, then Q
¤ < Q̂, and hence, G(Q¤) < G(Q̂) (that is,
if the second agent produces more than one half of the total output at the Nash-Cournot
equilibrium, then the leadership of the weaker agent 1 leads to decreasing of both his own
and the total level of production).
9 Examples of Models
In this section, we consider oligopolistic models of di®erent kinds considered in previous
sections and compare their equilibria.
9.1 Comparison of Cournot Model and Model with High Ex-
pectations
Consider the Cournot model with three ¯rms with linear costs at the market with a
hyperbolic inverse demand function. In Example 1, we compare it with the generalized
model in which all three agents assume wi ´ 2, i = 1; 2. It means that they are more
precautious than agents of the standard Cournot model and conjecture almost the same
behaviour of their rivals as their own.
Example 1 (n ¸ 2).
We assume that
fi(qi) = ciqi; i = 1; : : : ; n; p(G) = AG
¡1; Q ¸ 0:
Cournot Model
It means that
wi(G; qi) ´ 1; i = 1; : : : ; n;




qi = G; (57)
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¸ 0; qi'i = 0; i = 1; : : : ; n: (58)




























cj ¡ (n¡ 2)ci
3
5 ; i = 1; : : : ; n:

















A ; i = 1; 2; 3;















Now we compare these values with the corresponding ones in case when wi(G; qi) ´ 2,






The relationships between q¤i jwi´2 and q¤i jCournot depend upon the distances between
marginal cost values ci, ci = 1; 2; 3. More precisely, if all three really produce, then






If c1 < c2 < c3 then (60) implies that the strongest ¯rm i = 1 decreases its output,
whereas the two weaker ones may increase their outputs, in comparison to the classic
Cournot equilibrium.
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¹¤i jwi´2  ¹¤i jCournot







For instance, if c1 < c2 < c3 then we have
¹¤1jwi´2 < ¹¤1jCournot
for the strongest ¯rm i = 1 but
¹¤3jwi´2 > ¹¤3jCournot
for the weakest ¯rm i = 3.
9.2 Cournot Model vs Mixed Conjectures
In contrast to the previous example, in Example 2, the Cournot model is compared
with the generalized one where each ¯rm uses the mixed conjecture introduced in Section
5 with ®i = ¾i = 1=2.
Example 2 (n=2).
Cournot Model with Two Agents
















































> ¹¤i jCournot; i = 1; 2:
In the other words, the mixed conjectures lead to lower outputs but higher pro¯ts for
both agents.
9.3 Comparison of Stackelberg and Cournot Models
Here we illustrate the results of Section 8. Consider two ¯rms with linear costs at the
market with the hyperbolic inverse demand function,
n = 2; fi(qi) = ciqi; c1 < c2; Q = 0; p(G) = AG
¡1:




; j 6= i; i = 1; 2:
Therefore, q01(Ĝ) > 0 (strong ¯rm); q
0
2(Ĝ) < 0 (weak ¯rm).
Now we consider the following two cases.
1) Stakelberg Model: Strong Leader, Weak Follower
Doing the needed calculations we obtain
G¤ =
½
A=(2c1); if c2  2c1;
A=c2; if c2 > 2c1;





1); if c2  2c1;
A=c2; if c2 > 2c1;
in both cases, q¤1 > q̂1;
q¤2 =
½
A(2c1 ¡ c2)=(4c21); if c2  2c1;
0; if c2 > 2c1;
in both cases, q¤2 < q̂2;
¹¤1 =
½
Ac2=(4c1); if c2  2c1;
A(c2 ¡ c1)=c2; if c2 > 2c1;




A(2c1 ¡ c2)2=(4c21); if c2  2c1;
0; if c2 > 2c1;
in both cases, ¹¤2 < ¹̂2.
That is, in the case of leadership of the stroger ¯rm, both the total output and the
individual outputs grow up, hence the price goes down, which is good for consumers.
Moreover, the leader increases his pro¯t in comparison to Cournot case, whereas the
pro¯t of the follower decreases.
2) Stackelberg Model: Weak Leader, Strong Follower























(2c2 ¡ c1)2 > ¹̂1:
Here we see that under leadership of the weaker ¯rm, both the total output as well as
the individual outputs fall down (which is bad for consumers as the price goes up!). As
for the pro¯ts of the ¯rms, they both gain more in comparison to the standard Cournot
case.
9.4 Cournot Oligopoly vs Perfect Competition
In this subsection, we consider the homogeneous good market with two ¯rms that have
quadratic cost functions. We compare the standard Cournot oligopoly with the perfect
competition case, i.e. when wi ´ 0, i = 1; 2.
Hence, we have
n = 2; fi(qi) = ciq
2
i ; i = 1; 2; p(G) = AG
¡1; Q = 0:
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1) Cournot Model.
Find (G; q1; q2) ¸ 0 such that
q1 + q2 = G;



























































2) Perfect Competition (wi ´ 0).
Find (G; q1; q2) ¸ 0 such that
q1 + q2 = G;
'i ´ 2ciqi ¡
A
G







As for the relationships between q¤i;P and q
¤
i , it depends upon the relative value ° =













if 0 < ° < °¤, where °¤ is the unique positive root of the cubic polynomial y = x3 ¡ x2 ¡
x¡ 1.
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As we see, the perfect competition leads to higher total output but lower pro¯ts for both
agents, in comparison to the standard Cournot model.
10 Conclusions
Results of the paper allow one to consider not only two separate models: Walras
(perfect competition) and Cournot ones, but also the whole series of intermediate models
determined by di®erent values of the conjectural in°uence quotients wi 2 [0; 1]. Moreover,
some brand new models of oligopoly appear when one allows the factors wi to assume
values greater than 1.
In addition, both classic and extended (to the case of several leaders) Stackelberg
models can be embedded into the above-mentioned generalized oligopoly models by the
explicit construction of appropriate in°uence functions wi(qi; G) for the leaders.
Lastly, the in°uence quotients help one in conducting e±cient comparative statics
analysis for various models of oligopoly.
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